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Dynamic traffic control systems on freeways are highly complex facilities used for optimizing traffic flow and 
increasing traffic safety by, for instance, harmonizing speeds and displaying warnings to the road users. At the 
same time, the decentralized design of such systems comprising many distributed and inter-connected hardware 
and software components makes them costly to maintain in practice. Although there are several monitoring tools 
available, fault diagnostics still is an effortful (manual) process involving experienced staff in the traffic control 
center and in the field. Model-based support including the automatic generation of case-specific troubleshooting 
strategies depending on observed failures and evidences provide the chance to considerably increase the efficiency 
of fault management in this context. Bayesian networks as an established probabilistic framework for diagnostic 
reasoning in complex scenarios is discussed as a suitable model approach to meet these mentioned challenges. The 
general concept includes a transparent and human-interpretable deduction of diagnostic results as well as a high 
compatibility with current management processes in the traffic control center (e.g., ticketing). Not least, available 
system information and domain knowledge as already collected by common failure mode and effect analyses or 
similar approaches will support the creation of a valid diagnostic model in terms of a Bayesian network what is 
not possible in such an easy way for other popular modelling approaches as, for instance, neural networks. 
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1. Introduction 
Dynamic traffic control systems are important 
technical assets of the road infrastructure with 
regard to the efficiency and safety of traffic on 
highly utilized freeways (cf. FGSV, 2008). 
Based on distributed system architectures, they 
typically consist of numerous local sensors for 
measuring traffic flow and environmental 
conditions (cf. BMVI, 2018). Centralized and 
decentralized hardware and software components 
are responsible for data processing (including 
rule-based automated traffic control) and data 
communication. Human interaction in terms of 
manual control (as, for instance, in case of 
accident warnings) as well as continuous system 
monitoring is realized by operators in a traffic 
control center. Finally, from the viewpoint of the 
road users, the most visible components of such 
traffic control systems are the dynamic traffic 
signs used for displaying warnings (e.g., 
congestion, wet or icy road conditions, or 
accidents), speed limits, and possible restrictions 
on overtaking. 
Obviously, dynamic traffic control systems as 
described above are highly complex assets and 
thus difficult and expensive to maintain. In fact, 
fault identification often is an effortful manual 
process currently realized more or less 
systematically by experienced operators and 
maintenance engineers in the traffic control 
center and in the field (cf. Section 2). Model-
based tools for automatic failure detection and 
diagnosis (i.e., identification of failure reasons) 
such as Bayesian networks (cf. Section 3) 
therefore provide the chance to significantly 
improve the efficiency of current maintenance 
processes. 
The present contribution discusses these 
potentials from a scientific as well as a 
practitioner’s point of view (cf. Section 3) 
including a critical review of current 
maintenance strategies (cf. Section 2) and 
previous work on failure diagnostics for dynamic 
traffic control systems and comparable technical 
assets (cf. Section 3.2). The paper ends with 
some conclusions in Section 4. 
2. Current Practices 
The NRW Traffic Center plans, builds and 
operates all collective traffic control systems as 
part of the Intelligent Transport Systems (ITS) 
infrastructure on the motorways in the German 
federal state of North Rhine-Westphalia. These 
include line control systems, systems for 
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temporary release of hard shoulder, ramp 
metering systems as well as network control 
systems. Traffic control depending on the current 
traffic situation is partly realized as automatic 
process via the sub-centers, but some functions 
are also manually controlled by the operators in 
the control room of the traffic control center. The 
aim of traffic control is to increase traffic safety 
and to harmonize the traffic flow in order to 
reduce congestion. To achieve these goals 
comprehensively, a high availability of all 
related components in 24/7 operation must be 
guaranteed. 
The actual traffic control as one core process 
of the traffic control center must be separated 
from the technical operation of the system 
components and their maintenance. In Germany, 
the ITS infrastructure on the motorways fall 
under the so-called Act on the Federal Office for 
Information Technology (BSIG) as critical 
infrastructure. In this context, the systems must 
demonstrably fulfil special requirements 
regarding availability and integrity. But also 
from the quality management point of view, the 
technical operation of the systems is of great 
importance. As described in Neumann et al. 
(2017), the "maintenance and repair" process has 
a particularly high influence on failure rates and 
error propagation and thus on the quality and 
effectiveness of traffic management measures, in 
addition to a number of other processes, that are 
outlined in Estel and Rose (2021). 
Numerous components are required which 
together form the overall traffic control system. 
Figure 1, for example, shows the system “line 
control” with its main components. The 
measuring sections are used to monitor the 
traffic situation, and this information is passed 
on to the sub-control center via dedicated 
roadside stations. There, speed limits and 
warnings adapted to the traffic situation are 
selected by specialized algorithms which are 
then send to the displays at the corresponding 
cross sections on the road. At the same time, 
traffic data and information about the displayed 
warnings et cetera are transmitted via the remote 
bus to the traffic control center, where they are 
stored and analyzed. This includes forwarding 
them via various networks to the control room 
for being displayed to the operators. 
In the case of construction sites as well as 
unforeseeable events like accidents, the operators 
have to override displays and information to the 
road users as generated by the automatic 
algorithms of the sub-center, i.e. send control 
commands from the operating computer through 
various communication networks back to the 
sub-center and to the roadside station. The 
variable message signs at the traffic sign gantries 
must then quickly and clearly display the desired 
traffic signs in the required brightness. 
 
 
Figure 1: System components of a line control system. 
Only if all components work reliably, all 
functions can be fully executed and the full 
economic benefit in terms of traffic safety and 
traffic flow can be achieved. For this reason, 
with few exceptions, all components are kept in 
as fail-safe operation as possible through 
extensive maintenance and repair contracts. 
These contracts not only cover technical 
components (roadside stations, traffic sign 
transmitters, cameras ...) or computer hardware 
(operating computers, servers, routers, switches 
…), but also the specialist applications, operating 
systems and firewalls used (e.g. through 
extensive patch management). Maintenance in 
the sense of proactive support is carried out on 
the IT side by means of internal and external 
operational monitoring, while the track-side 
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components and sub-centers are inspected on site 
every six months. If a component fails, repair 
measures are initiated. The contracts provide 
fixed reaction times. Service level agreements 
have been concluded for some, but not all 
individual components. 
However, in the malfunction event, it is often 
challenging to isolate and identify the cause of 
failure or the component actually affected which 
hinders the fault from being eliminated as 
quickly as possible. Malfunctions can be 
detected in the control room, on the line or by 
service providers and must then lead to the 
triggering of the fault management support 
process. Due to the complexity of the overall 
system and the different responsibilities for 
individual components, the fault management 
process has also been time-consuming up to 
now. Although there are several operational 
monitoring tools now (cf. Estel and von der 
Ruhren, 2013), especially in the area of IT 
components and networks, which can help to 
locate the source of error, it is not possible to 
consider all components with these tools. Nor 
can the direction of cause and effect be clarified 
beyond doubt. There is also a lack of meaningful 
documentation on past faults and their causes 
(incl. protocols of the elimination), which could 
be helpful in current fault situations in terms of 
defining suitable troubleshooting strategies. 
For the purpose of improving the related 
processes, the existing practices were analyzed 
and essential difficulties (pain points) were 
identified. In addition to the lack of 
documentation and insufficient lessons learned 
with all parties involved, the ticket system used 
up to that point was also identified as insufficient 
with regard to the requirements. Organizational 
issues such as responsibilities and lack of 
feedback on fault events were also mentioned. 
Due to missing content-supporting 
documentation of previous trouble shootings and 
experiences (e.g. error trees), every new fault 
leads to a new search. This could be improved by 
a regular analysis of comprehensively 
documented fault rectifications. 
As a result of this analysis, the essential 
contents of fault management were derived using 
the SIPOC method (SIPOC = suppliers, inputs, 
process, outputs, and customers). A new ticket 
system (open source) is currently being 
introduced, which has an interface to the existing 
Configuration Management Database (CMDB) 
which allows access as well as management of 
so-called Configuration Items (CI), such as 
servers, computers, IT services and network 
components, but also ITS roadside elements. 
This means that all components that could be 
affected by a fault are already known, as well as 
the associated system components or 
communication paths. Within the framework of 
an internal working group, cause-effect 
relationships are worked out on the basis of the 
employees' wealth of experience using methods 
for problem solving (e.g. Ishikawa diagrams, 
FMEA). Probabilities and frequencies are 
derived in order to use support tools more 
effectively in the future within the framework of 
fault management, and also in order to change 
the sequence of the components to be tested 
depending on the fault pattern. The overall aim is 
to speed up the identification of causes of error 
in the case of failure. 
3. Improved Fault Diagnostics using  
Bayesian Networks 
The current practices (see Section 2) show that 
systematic tools for fault diagnostics provide the 
chance to significantly reduce the (manual) 
efforts in the context of fault management of 
dynamic traffic control systems on freeways. In 
this regard, models should not only represent the 
qualitative cause-effect relations but should also 
be able to provide quantitative estimates of fault 
probabilities and to automatically propose 
dedicated troubleshooting strategies depending 
on given evidences on failures and states of the 
system components. 
Bayesian networks as a well-established 
mathematical approach for diagnostic reasoning 
provide an ideal framework with regard to the 
mentioned tasks (cf. Fenton and Neil, 2013). 
Moreover, the process of designing Bayesian 
networks based on expert knowledge can be seen 
in close relation to other common (qualitative) 
approaches (e.g., FMEA) for eliciting causes and 
effects in technical systems. In fact, some 
extended methods based on failure nets and/or 
probabilistic FMEA (cf. Kaiser and 
Rauschenbach, 2015) can directly be used for 
systematically creating Bayesian networks from 
such knowledge (cf. Rauschenbach and Nuffer, 
2019). 
Not least, Bayesian networks have the 
favorable property that they provide a highly 
transparent mathematical representation of even 
complex (technical) systems. That is, in contrast 
to other popular approaches such as neural 
networks, the diagnostic reasoning process of 
Bayesian networks can usually be validated 
directly by humans via interpreting not only final 
but also intermediate results step by step. 
Clearly, this kind of readability of the model is a 
big advantage with regard to practical 
applications. Indeed, the acceptance of 
diagnostic tools often depends on whether they 
can intuitively be understood by technicians 
from the respective domain as was mentioned by 
Silmon and Roberts (2010) with regard to 
railway switches, for instance. 
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Another important aspect, also mentioned by 
Silmon and Roberts (2010), is that the diagnostic 
reasoning and the computations needed for that 
can be executed automatically. With numerous 
exact and approximate algorithms available for 
solving this task, Bayesian networks completely 
fulfil this requirement. In fact, various existing 
software tools and libraries for editing and 
computing Bayesian networks provide even 
additional support for deeper studies on the 
implemented models including sensitivity 
analyses (Coupé and van der Gaag, 2002) or 
algorithms for parameter learning (Mahjoub and 
Kalti, 2011). That is, the integration of Bayesian 
diagnostic models with other software 
components of the fault management process 
such as the CMDB or the ticket system 
mentioned in Section 2 is not an insurmountable 
problem but just a matter of technical 
implementation of interfaces and workflows. 
3.1 Theoretical approach 
Bayesian networks are a special kind of 
probabilistic graphical models (Koller and 
Friedman, 2009), which allow the visual 
representation and compact coding of complex 
stochastic dependencies between different 
random variables (= nodes) with any number of 
(discrete) states. With regard to a traffic control 
system as in Figure 1, these random variables 
could be defined by the components and sub-
components of the system together with their 
possible failure states and faults. The nodes 
relevant to the problem are arranged then in the 
form of a directed, acyclic graph (cf. Figure 2). 
Edges represent the (usually causal) influence of 
a node on its immediate successors (= child 
nodes). Moreover, the dependency structure 
between more distant nodes complies with the 
graph-theoretical principle of d-separation or d-
connectivity (Charniak, 1991). 
 
 
Figure 2: Bayesian network (Example) 
This enables complex forms of model-based 
reasoning in which knowledge (= evidence) 
about the state of individual nodes can be used to 
efficiently calculate the resulting (conditional) 
state probabilities of all other nodes in the 
network. Causal reasoning happens when 
knowledge about the state of a node Xi affects 
the state probabilities of one or more (not 
necessarily immediate) successors Xj. 
Conversely, diagnostic reasoning means that 
evidences for a given node affects the 
probabilities of the parent or further upstream 
ancestor nodes. Finally, intercausal reasoning is 
of particular interest when there are two or more 
possible causes for a given observed (direct or 
indirect) effect. If, for example, one of these 
possible causes (Xi) can be eliminated as the 
reason for the observed effect, the probabilities 
of the other causes usually increase. Conversely, 
the probability of the other causes decreases if Xi 
(at least in part) can be identified as the actual 
trigger for the given effect. In the literature, this 
phenomenon is also referred to as "Explaining 
Away" (Koller and Friedman, 2009). 
Besides the fundamental stochastic 
dependencies between the random variables of 
the Bayesian network, which are almost 
completely coded by the structure of the 
underlying graph, the actual quantification of the 
mutual influence between the nodes of the 
network is represented by local conditional 
probability distributions of the form P(Xi|Pa(Xi)), 
where Pa(Xi) is the set of parent nodes of the 
node Xi. The full definition of a Bayesian 
network thus requires the construction of the 
underlying graph and, in a second step, the 
determination of the local (conditional) 
probability distributions for each single node (= 
parametrization). 
Once all this is done, the Bayesian network 
can be used for automatically computing the 
marginal and conditional probabilities of all node 
states depending on any type of evidence in 
terms of exact (or even uncertain) knowledge 
about the true state of some of the nodes in the 
network. That is, given a certain malfunction of 
the modelled technical system, the Bayesian 
network consistently yields suitable estimates for 
the probabilities of all possible faults that may 
have caused the observed malfunction. Notably, 
it is even possible to iteratively feed the network 
with further evidence whenever there are new 
findings concerning some of the nodes, e.g., 
because of additionally performed tests. Thus, 
Bayesian networks systematically help to 
localize the true cause of failure by supporting 
the probabilistic reasoning process when 
analyzing the available evidences with regard to 
the given malfunction. 
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Even more, Bayesian networks do not only 
mimic and automatize human reasoning under 
uncertainty but can also be used for deriving 
optimal troubleshooting strategies (cf. Huang et 
al., 2015). That is, by automatically analyzing 
the sensitivities in the model, for instance, it is 
possible in each step to detect those nodes in the 
network where additional knowledge about their 
states yields the most information with regard to 
reducing the uncertainty about the actual cause 
of failure. In other words, possibly weighted by 
relevant costs and/or efforts, the Bayesian 
network could tell the user directly what to do 
next given any specific error pattern, i.e., what 
component should be checked or which 
additional diagnostic test should be performed. 
Needless to say, this approach essentially helps 
to structure and harmonize the process of fault 
identification and finally makes it independent of 
the individual experience and knowledge of the 
operator or maintenance engineer on duty. 
Nonetheless, the underlying model has to be 
validated, of course, involving experienced 
professionals as well as possibly available 
documentation of previous failures. 
3.2 Previous research 
Bayesian networks have been used in many 
technical disciplines so far. Cai et al. (2017) 
provide an extensive review of recent 
applications for energy systems, manufacturing 
systems and others. In addition to that, clinical 
diagnostics is a well-established field where 
Bayesian networks have been developed and 
applied successfully over the years (Sierra et al., 
2000). In fact, some of the most famous 
examples of Bayesian networks such as the 
Pathfinder model (Heckerman and Nathwani, 
1992) have arisen from this field. 
With regard to transportation systems, 
Bayesian networks have been proposed for 
assessing road traffic safety (Grande et al., 
2017), detecting travel modes (Xiao et al., 2015), 
or modeling travellers’ satisfaction with railway 
transport (Perucca and Salini, 2016), for 
instance. In particular, recent ideas in context of 
fault diagnostics for railway switches (Neumann 
et al., 2019) are very similar to what is proposed 
here to be done for dynamic traffic control 
systems on motorways. 
Not least, Neumann et al. (2017) described a 
Bayesian network trying to represent how faults 
or deficiencies from planning to operation affect 
the functionality of dynamic traffic control 
systems. Using a structured FMEA, the authors 
derived a functional model where all relevant 
processes and elements of a hypothetical 
dynamic traffic control system were listed in 
functional relation to each other. The goal here 
was to identify the most crucial technical and/or 
organizational processes in the life cycle of such 
facilities in order to improve the quality of traffic 
control by optimizing these processes as part of a 
systematic quality management (cf. Estel and 
Rose, 2021). In this regard, Neumann et al. 
(2017) found that “maintenance and repair”, for 
instance, is one the most crucial processes when 
operating a traffic control system over the years. 
However, due to structural limitations – such as 
simplified error propagation via aggregated 
(instead of detailed) fault modes – the model 
from Neumann et al. (2017) did not allow for 
proper diagnostics in terms of reliably 
identifying specific causes of error in case of 
given observed failures. In fact, the respective 
Bayesian network was shown to be a mostly 
qualitative rather than a precise quantitative 
model. 
Consequently, there still is a strong need for 
systematic and automated tool support with 
regard to fault diagnostics of traffic control 
systems in order to further improve the 
maintenance process and thus to increase 
reliability and availability of the relevant assets. 
3.3 Model implementation 
Even if there is no real implementation yet, 
Figure 3 shows the draft layout of a possible 
Bayesian network that could apply to the 
proposed context. As can be seen, the nodes are 
closely related to the real components of a 
dynamic traffic control system as depicted in 
Figure 1. The red edge labels, by the way, refer 
to the main functionality of each node with 
regard to its respective child. That is, faults 
related to this node-specific functionality can be 
expected to directly infer the proper working of 
the subsequent components. 
The roadside station, for instance, will usually 
not be able to provide suitably aggregated data in 
case of major defects of the connected sensors 
even if there might be algorithms for correcting 
or interpolating missing and/or erroneous data. 
Furthermore, the sub-center requires the 
unimpeded data communication via a local data 
bus in order to receive (correct) data from the 
roadside station. And, the control panels in the 
control room (cf. Figure 1) depend on the 
network connection to the data management 
system of the traffic control center as well as on 
the reliability of the data management itself.  
Finally, displaying variable traffic signs and 
warnings adequately to traffic and environmental 
conditions is possible only if there are correct 
switching commands from the roadside station 
together with well-performing algorithmic 
control at the sub-center and/or accurate manual 
control via the control panels. Of course, all 
relevant communication lines (i.e. network 
and/or data buses) have to be available, too. 
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Figure 3: Possible basic structure of the proposed 
Bayesian network (Draft) 
Needless to say, the model from Figure 3 is 
certainly not complete. Important components 
such as power supply or others are still missing 
obviously. Moreover, fault states per node 
including their mutual dependencies need to be 
described and quantified in detail. The 
corresponding concretization and further 
development including possible revisions of the 
proposed draft model from Figure 3 will be part 
of future work. 
3.4 Practical benefits 
Due to the complexity of the overall structure of 
traffic control systems and the numerous 
individual causes of failure per component, a 
targeted probabilistic troubleshooting strategy 
based on the concept as outlined in Section 3.1 
would definitely support the fault management 
process. By limiting and prioritizing the possible 
causes of error for given error patterns and by 
being able to further reduce the number of error 
sources by entering further known evidence, e.g. 
tests that have already been carried out, the 
process of finding the true cause of failure can be 
simplified and employees can be relieved from 
testing less probable sources of error.  
The benefit becomes even larger if the tools 
for optimizing the case-specific troubleshooting 
strategy are directly linked to the ticket system of 
the fault management (cf. Section 2). In this 
regard, the ticket process between the persons 
responsible for the various components could be 
oriented towards the probabilities computed by 
the (Bayesian) diagnostic model and, depending 
on the fault pattern and already excluded causes 
of error, could be targeted towards the most 
probable faults. Another argument in favor of 
such integration into the ticket system is that 
fault processing can be carried out then by 
technical employees without the need for 
understanding the complex mathematical 
background of the diagnostic model – as the one 
proposed above – in detail. 
Note that, as a first step and instead of a fully 
automated integration, the tool could of course 
also be placed with a trained first level support 
who manually determines the most probable 
causes using the model before forwarding the 
ticket accordingly to the maintenance staff. 
Therefore, even without larger efforts for the 
technical integration (i.e., without detailed 
implementation of software interfaces and 
automated workflows), benefits resulting from 
the application of the diagnostic model can be 
realized within the given ticket system. 
On the long term, it could then be worked on 
to continuously and automatically update the 
parameters and inherent probabilities of the 
diagnostic model, which will initially be based 
on the experience of the employees, by 
systematically analyzing future failures, their 
fault patterns and causes, and thus to allow the 
model to make increasingly reliable statements. 
Needless to say, this definitely is a future second 
step from now on and requires establishing a 
systematic feedback about true causes of failure 
first including standardized processes for their 
documentation by the maintenance staff. In this 
case, a full technical integration with the official 
ticketing process would be very helpful, too. 
4. Conclusion 
As discussed in previous sections, the creation 
and application of a comprehensive 
(probabilistic) diagnostic model (cf. Section 3) 
for the complex cause-and-effect relations within 
the overall technical structure of a traffic control 
system have the potential to significantly 
simplify the process of fault management in the 
traffic control center including a speed-up of 
fault diagnosis and the avoidance of parallel 
work. That is, by applying such a model for 
automatically identifying the most probable 
failure reasons in case of malfunctions of the 
system and deriving optimal troubleshooting 
strategies based on current evidences, the 
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efficiency of fault management is expected to 
increase. Disturbed traffic control systems or 
components can be repaired more quickly and 
thus economic damage in the sense of unrealized 
benefits with regard to traffic safety and traffic 
flow is reduced. 
In this context, the next step will be to collect 
and transform already compiled expert 
knowledge about traffic control systems (cf. 
Section 2) in such a way that it allows to create a 
valid Bayesian network for a given (real) facility 
from that. Approaches for model and parameter 
elicitation such as described by Rauschenbach 
and Nuffer (2019) as well as experiences from 
previous research (e.g., Neumann et al., 2017) 
are expected to be very helpful in this regard. 
Once the model is calibrated and validated, the 
technical integration into the operational 
processes of the traffic control center will be an 
important milestone with regard to optimizing 
the fault management of the connected traffic 
control systems. Further studies could then try to 
expand the diagnostic model by dynamic aspects 
in such a way that it does not only allow for 
identifying existing faults but also to predict 
future failures based on available data and 
evidences where possible. This could facilitate 
even further improvements of the related 
maintenance processes by a shift towards more 
predictive instead of currently mostly corrective 
strategies. 
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